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I.

INTRODUCTION

This article reviews the history of discovery in Minnesota
practice under the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, analyzes
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the place of electronic discovery in Minnesota today, and attempts
to predict how the courts may deal with electronic discovery issues
in the future. At one point it was reasonable to analogize
Minnesota e-discovery to Minnesota’s infamous weather—everyone
was talking about it but no one was doing anything about it. With
amendments to the rules in recent years, that is not really a fair
criticism, as the Minnesota courts have attempted to prevent
e-discovery from subverting the strong policy goal of resolving
disputes promptly, fairly, and inexpensively.
Minnesota has historically followed the lead of the federal
1
courts in establishing court rules. This article discusses how that
has occurred with respect to discovery in particular, and reviews
how e-discovery problems have emerged as major challenges to the
“just, speedy, and inexpensive” determination of civil cases
2
promised by Rule 1 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure.
This article explores the history of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
efforts to deal with the challenges of e-discovery, both in following
federal rule changes where they are deemed wise and in forging its
own solutions where the federal solutions are either ill-suited to
3
Minnesota or too limited to address the issues sufficiently. In 2013,
the court adopted recommendations of its Civil Justice Reform
Task Force to deal with some of these issues, many without federal
4
court counterparts.
This article attempts to predict what the future may hold for
5
e-discovery in Minnesota. Those predictions will be informed by
the following articles in this issue, but if history is any guide, the
Minnesota solution to e-discovery problems will involve considered,
measured review of any federal court rule reforms, together with
careful consideration of changes originating in Minnesota or
tailored to Minnesota’s needs.
II. BACKGROUND ON COURT RULES AND ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY
In the early days of litigation under the Rules of Civil
Procedure (since 1938 in federal courts and since 1953 in

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IX.
See infra Part IV, VIII.
See infra Part IX.
See infra Part XI.
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Minnesota state courts), electronic discovery really didn’t exist.
Commerce was not conducted in cyberspace and records were not
created or stored in electronic form. The rules reflected the greater
world—discovery involved witnesses, paper documents, and
occasionally tangible things other than documents. Entire files on
transactions existed in a single file folder, and a thin one at that. If
copies of documents existed, they were necessarily “carbon
7
copies,” unless a scrivener had been employed to create a
duplicate. If there were copies, they would generally number one
or two (more than that would be illegible).
How the world has changed! The photocopy machine
probably brought the most dramatic change in the world of
commerce that impacted the litigation process. Suddenly
numerous copies might be created of documents that might be
relevant to a civil dispute. Additionally, the litigation process itself
could create multiple additional copies of the documents. But the
photocopier’s impact pales in comparison to the changes wrought
by the high-speed digital computer. These machines have brought
changes the rule makers never contemplated. The rules
8
committees have been playing catch-up ever since.
While the changes in the use of computers in virtually every
corner of our lives are clear and undisputable, questions about how
these changes should be reflected in the judicial process never have
been easy to answer. It is tempting just to say that electronic
6. Current versions of the Minnesota and Federal Rules are most frequently
accessed by consulting 1 MINNESOTA RULES OF COURT (2013) (state rules) and
FEDERAL CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURE AND RULES (Westlaw rev. ed. 2013). Local rules
for the federal courts in Minnesota are found in 2 MINNESOTA RULES OF COURT
(2013) (federal rules). Those volumes contain compilations of the various
amendments to the state and federal civil rules. Similar compilations of the
Minnesota state civil rules are also available in volume 15 of the MINNESOTA
STATUTES (2012), and of the federal civil rules in 28 U.S.C. (2006).
7. “[A] thin paper faced with a waxy pigmented coating so that when placed
between two sheets of paper the pressure of writing or typing on the top sheet
causes transfer of pigment to the bottom sheet.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 185 (11th ed. 2003) (defining “carbon paper”). Carbon paper allowed
the creation of a single copy; multiple copies could be made by using very thin
paper, familiarly known as “tissue” paper, and multiple sets of carbon paper and
the tissue paper. Each layer in the sandwich was a little less clear than the last.
8. The “crisis” of e-discovery is not universally viewed as dire. For an article
suggesting that the e-discovery crisis might be a little overblown, see James M.
Rosenbaum, The Death of E-Discovery, FED. LAW., July 2007, at 26, 26.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014

3

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 3

2014]

E-DISCOVERY UNDER THE MINNESOTA RULES

393

records are the equivalent of documents and should simply be
treated as documents in discovery and proof at trial. This is a
simple approach, and it has served to answer many simple
questions. However, it ignores that as computer systems evolved,
electronic records acquired features that distinguished them from
their paper forebears—multiple versions were created, often with
no notice to or action by the user. Probably the most important
form of data in the world of electronic documents with no real
9
counterpart in paper documents is metadata.
Discovery has been a substantial part of Minnesota civil
procedure since Minnesota adopted the Minnesota Rules of Civil
10
Procedure in 1952. The Minnesota rules closely followed the
9. See generally BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., MANAGING DISCOVERY OF
ELECTRONIC INFORMATION: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 3 (2007). The Manual for
Complex Litigation identifies (and defines) several categories of data, most of
which really don’t typically exist in paper-based systems:

Metadata. These include information about a particular file, attached to it
and part of it electronically, but usually not part of what might be printed,
and often not even readily accessible by the user. A good example is
information about each document in most word processing documents that
shows when it was created, by whom, when it was last edited, by whom, etc.

System Data. These are data created and maintained by the computer itself,
and include a wide array of settings, logs of activity, records on file location,
access to other devices, changes in settings, etc.

Backup Data. These are data created or maintained for the purpose of shortterm disaster recovery, and can include backup files on the host computer,
though most often these data are on separate disks or tapes stored away from
the host computer system.

Files Purposely Deleted by a User.

Residual Data. These data may arise for several reasons, but essentially are
underlying data that are not removed when part of a block of memory is
used for another purpose. These may not comprise an entire file, but rather
just pieces of it.
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, FOURTH § 11.446, at 77–79
(2004). Each of these categories may involve information that may be relevant to
litigation and may properly be discoverable. Id. at 79. Many of them would be, or
would be in some situations, “not reasonably accessible because of undue burden
or cost,” and would therefore not be routinely discoverable under FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(2)(B) or MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.02(b)(2).
10. See MINNESOTA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURT 26–37
(1951). For discussion of the rules’ consideration and adoption in Minnesota, see
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, WRIGHT’S MINNESOTA RULES (1954). See also David Louisell,
Discovery and Pre-Trial Under the Minnesota Rules, 36 MINN. L. REV. 633 (1952)
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provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which had been
adopted in 1938. Since that original adoption, Minnesota has
generally followed the lead of the United States Supreme Court
and has considered and adopted federal rules changes. The
problems of discovery reform have, in many states, led state rule
11
makers to impose limitations on wide-open discovery. Minnesota
has been part of that trend, imposing a numerical limit on the use
of interrogatories. In 1968 the number of permitted interrogatories
12
was limited to fifty. Not until 1993 would the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure impose any such limit, when a twenty-five interrogatory
13
limit was imposed. In 1996 Minnesota considered, but declined to
14
adopt, that lower twenty-five interrogatory limit..
E-discovery issues have confronted the Federal Rules
Committee, and that Committee recommended important rule
15
changes in 2006 that the Supreme Court adopted. Those changes
16
took effect on December 1, 2006. Minnesota followed with the
2007 amendments to the Minnesota Rules, adopting the federal
17
changes in substantial part.
The Federal Advisory Committee continues to wrestle with
e-discovery and is currently considering rule amendments that
18
would address some of the pending issues. We can expect that

(comparing the Minnesota discovery rules with the newly adopted federal
discovery rules); Note, Discovery Practice in States Adopting the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 68 HARV. L. REV. 673 (1955) (comparing several states’ discovery rules
with the newly adopted federal discovery rules).
11. See, e.g., Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New Federalism in State Civil Justice:
Developing a Uniform Code of State Civil Procedure Through a Collaborative Rule-Making
Process, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1216 (2005) (“Most jurisdictions . . . impose some
form of rule-based limits on discovery volume.”).
12. MINN. R. CIV. P. 33.01(a) advisory committee’s comment (1968
amendment).
13. See FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a) advisory committee’s note (1993 amendment).
14. MINN. R. CIV. P. 33.01(a) advisory committee’s comment (1996
amendment).
15. See infra Part VII.
16. By statute, the Supreme Court adopts rules that take effect on December
1st of the year of adoption, provided that they are submitted to Congress by May
1st and Congress does not act to prevent their effectiveness. 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a)
(2012).
17. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. (2007), with MINN. R. CIV. P. (2007).
18. See Memorandum from David G. Campbell, Chair, Advisory Comm.
on Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, to Jeffrey S. Sutton, Chair, Standing Comm.
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those changes, if eventually adopted in the federal courts, will in
time be taken up by the Minnesota Supreme Court and its Advisory
Committee. But Minnesota has not slavishly followed federal rule
amendments, nor has it confined itself to rule changes adopted in
federal courts. E-discovery issues are a likely candidate for further
rulemaking unrelated to any limitation federal-rule amendments,
especially if a consensus were to develop as to the nature and
seriousness of the problems faced in Minnesota.
In 2013, the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted significant
rule changes that originated not with its Advisory Committee on
Rules of Civil Procedure, but with the Minnesota Supreme Court
19
Task Force on Civil Justice Reform.
The Task Force
recommendations were not focused particularly on e-discovery, but
on Rules of Practice & Procedure (May 8, 2013), http://www.uscourts.gov
/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV05-2013.pdf; see also infra Part X.
19. See Order Nos. ADM10-8051, 09-8009, 04-8001, Order Adopting
Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure (Minn. Feb. 4, 2013), available at
http://www.mncourts.gov/?page=511; Order Nos. ADM10-8051, 09-8009, 04-8001,
Order Promulgating Corrective Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure
(Minn. Feb. 12, 2013), available at http://www.mncourts.gov/?page=511; Order
Nos. ADM10-8051, 09-8009, 04-8001, Order Authorizing Expedited Civil Litigation
Track Pilot Project and Adopting Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure
(Minn. May 7, 2013), available at http://www.mncourts.gov/?page=511. These
orders amended or adopted the following rules:
MINN. R. CIV. P. 1
MINN. R. CIV. P. 3
MINN. R. CIV. P. 5.04

MINN. R. CIV. P. 26

MINN. R. CIV. P. 37
MINN. GEN. R. PRAC.
8.13, 104, 111, 114, 146
MINN. GEN. R. PRAC.
115.04(d)
MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 146

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol40/iss2/3

 Added new proportionality provision.
 Added cross-reference to new filing requirement in
MINN. R. CIV. P. 5.04.
 Added new requirement that actions be filed within
one year of commencement.
 Added automatic disclosure requirements.
 Recast proportionality requirement in MINN. R. CIV.
P. 26.02(b).
 Created mandatory discovery conference and
discovery plan.
 Provided for sanctions for failure to make required
disclosures or failure to participate in framing a
discovery plan.
 Modified scheduling process and adopted new Civil
Cover Sheet.
 Adopted new expedited motion procedure for
nondispositive motions.
 Adopted procedure for Complex Case Project.
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necessarily addressed it. Probably the most significant provision
recommended by the Task Force and adopted by the court is the
inclusion of an express requirement for consideration of
20
proportionality. This important amendment to Rule 1 is not
21
modeled after any existing provision in the Federal Rules.
Proportionality is one of the most important issues on the
e-discovery front.
Because Minnesota has not marched in lockstep with the
federal courts on matters of procedure, it is not possible to predict
that it will simply sit back and wait for the Federal Rules process to
end. The recent activities of both the Minnesota and Federal Rules
Advisory Committees, as well as the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
concern about the issues, as reflected in its appointment of a Civil
Justice Reform Task Force and adoption of several
recommendations of that task force, suggest that these issues are
important. It is reasonable to predict that if the Federal Rules are
amended to deal with e-discovery issues, the Minnesota Supreme
Court will take a serious look at the amendments and ask its
Advisory Committee to consider their merits for adoption in
Minnesota. In addition, Minnesota may well look at other solutions,
as it has in the past, either out of greater concern about the
problems or the presence of issues in state court litigation that are
22
not really present in federal court litigation.
It seems implicit that the civil dispute resolution process
should not consume more in litigation costs than is involved in the
dispute. This notion has not been embraced in any court rule or
23
policy, but seems fundamental. That recognition should drive

20. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 1 (effective July 1, 2013).
21. See infra Part X.A. Compare MINN. R. CIV. P. 1 (“It is the responsibility of
the court . . . to examine each civil action to assure that the process and the costs
are proportionate to the amount in controversy . . . .”), with FED. R. CIV. P. 1
(containing no such clause).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 37–46.
23. This disputed notion of balancing cost versus amount was expressly
considered by the Minnesota Supreme Court Civil Justice Reform Task Force in its
December 23, 2011, Final Report. The task force observed: “High litigation costs
cause parties to forgo claims that do not exceed the litigation expenses . . . . The
surveys and studies also present evidence of agreement that litigation costs also
drive cases to settle for reasons unrelated to the substantive merit of the claims or
defenses.” RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM TASK FORCE: FINAL REPORT 11 (Dec. 23, 2011), available at http://www

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014

7

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 3

2014]

E-DISCOVERY UNDER THE MINNESOTA RULES

397

innovative approaches to provide e-discovery that is needed to
present the merits of the parties’ cases for resolution, without
consuming the parties’ resources and exhausting the courts
through obtaining and reviewing electronic records that do not
help with that resolution in a meaningful way.
III. THE “ELECTRONIC DARK AGES” (1938–1952)
24

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1938.
They came about after extensive study and discussion with the
bench and bar, and with input from the academic community. The
rules brought many changes but didn’t address electronic discovery
in any meaningful way. Quite simply, they didn’t need to. Highspeed digital computing didn’t exist, at least not outside the
laboratory, and records were created and maintained on paper and
in file cabinets (if retained at all).
25
Pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, the Federal Rules
have repeatedly been amended since their adoption. The adoption
process requires promulgation of rules by the Supreme Court with
the effective date deferred to December 1st of the year of adoption,
giving Congress the ability to intercede to prevent any rule from
26
taking effect. The amendments have kept the rules current and
have helped them adapt to developments in the types of cases filed
and their case management needs. An important amendment was
made in 1946, adding a provision to Rule 26 that provided that, at a
deposition, “[i]t is not ground for objection that the testimony
sought . . . appears reasonably calculated to . . . the discovery of
27
admissible evidence.” This broadening language was extended to

.mncourts.gov/Documents/0/Public/Court_Information_Office/Civil_Justice
_Ref_Task_Force_Dec_2011_Rpt.pdf.
24. 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1004 (3d ed. 2002) (discussing the formulation of the Federal
Rules).
25. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, §§ 1, 2, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (codified as
amended 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012)). For discussion of the Act, see Stephen B.
Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982).
26. The history of adoption and early amendments to the Federal Rules is set
forth in 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 24, §§ 1001–08.
27. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (1946).
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all discovery by the 1970 reorganizing amendments to the discovery
28
rules.
Discovery itself was one of the major innovations of the Federal
Rules. The merger of law and equity probably is more earthshaking
and fundamentally important to the structure of civil litigation, but
the creation of routine use of discovery in any type of case
undoubtedly was important and one of the enduring impacts on
most civil cases. The establishment of discovery by the rules was
29
fairly viewed as revolutionary.
IV. THE REUNION OF FEDERAL AND MINNESOTA CIVIL PROCEDURE
IN 1953
The years 1938 and 1953 are the bookends of the period when
the federal courts were using their new rules of civil procedure and
the Minnesota courts were continuing to follow statute-based rules
30
of procedure.
Minnesota did not immediately embrace the changes made in
the federal courts in 1938; not until 1953 did Minnesota adopt the
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, modeled closely on the
31
Federal Rules as they then existed. Since 1953, Minnesota has
generally followed—not quite in lockstep and usually with some
32
time lag—the developments in the Federal Rules. There have
been relatively few federal procedural changes that did not see
33
eventual adoption in Minnesota.
28. The 1970 amendments to the Federal Rules were adopted in Minnesota
in 1975. See infra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
29. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Ulysses Tied to the Generic Whipping Post: The
Continuing Odyssey of Discovery “Reform,” 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 202 (2001);
Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938
Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 734 (1998).
30. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. (1938), and FED. R. CIV. P. (1953) (exemplifying
the federal courts’ use of new rules), with MINN. R. CIV. P. (1938), and MINN. R.
CIV. P. (1953) (demonstrating Minnesota courts’ use of statute-based rules).
31. MINN. R. CIV. P. (1952). The adoption of the rules in Minnesota is also
discussed in note 10. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
32. See generally David F. Herr, A Parting of Ways? Amendments to the Civil
Rules—State and Federal, BENCH & B. MINN., July 2000, at 29, available at http://www
.mnbar.org/benchandbar/2000/jul00/civil-rules.htm (discussing the history of
the relationship between the Minnesota and Federal Rules).
33. The most sweeping of the federal amendments, although arguably the
most insignificant from a substantive standpoint, were the 2007 so-called
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A good example of Minnesota’s approach to the Federal Rules,
especially relevant to the issues here, occurred in 1975. In 1970, the
Federal Rules were extensively amended, with the changes focusing
34
on discovery. Not until five years later, in 1975, did Minnesota
35
amend its rules to adopt the vast majority of those changes. This
lag is typical of the approach the Minnesota Supreme Court and its
Advisory Committees have taken to federal rule amendments. The
1970 federal amendments were significant and changed many
36
aspects of discovery practice. The 1975 amendments to the
Minnesota rules were similarly impactful because they made several
important changes to how discovery is conducted, and the Advisory
37
Committee carefully considered the desirability of each change.
More recently, the Minnesota Supreme Court has not been as
slavish in its consideration of federal rule changes. A good example
of this came with the 1991 federal rule amendments, which made
important and far-reaching changes, including the revamping and
38
relabeling of post-trial motions. These amendments were not
39
adopted in Minnesota until 2006. This lag initially is attributable
to reluctance to make changes that were both far reaching in
impact and nominally trivial—the mere relabeling of the motions

“restyling” amendments. Those amendments to the federal rules restyled the
federal rules but were intended not to change the meaning or interpretation of
the rules. See, e.g., Edward H. Cooper, Restyling the Civil Rules: Clarity Without
Change, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1761 (2004). These changes have not been given
substantive attention by the Minnesota Supreme Court for adoption in Minnesota.
For a discussion of the elusiveness of changing wording without changing
meaning, see Steven S. Gensler, Must, Should, Shall, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1139 (2010).
34. See FED. R. CIV. P. (1970).
35. See MINN. R. CIV. P. (1975).
36. See, e.g., 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2003 (3d ed. 2010).
37. The 1975 changes in Minnesota practice were just as extensive as the
1970 amendments were to federal discovery practice, and their importance was as
well. The 1975 Minnesota amendments are analyzed in detail in William B.
Danforth, The 1975 Amendments to the Minnesota Discovery Rules, 3 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 39 (1977).
38. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)–(b) advisory committee’s note (1991
amendment). Under these changes, the motion for directed verdict under FED. R.
CIV. P. 50(a) and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Rule 50(b) were
redefined and relabeled, both becoming motions for “judgment as a matter of
law.”
39. See MINN. R. CIV. P. (2006).
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would not seem to justify the substantial risk that parties would fail
to file the motions properly and the risks that would flow from that
40
failure.
Since 1953, Minnesota has had a history of following the lead
of the federal courts in amending the rules of procedure. A cogent
statement on the guiding philosophy of the Advisory Committee on
state conformity to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was
provided to the Minnesota Supreme Court in the Committee’s
report in 1996, recommending adoption of several, but not all, of
the federal amendments that had followed the Committee’s most
recent report to the court. The Committee stated:
The committee continues to believe that, as a general
principle, it is desirable to have the rules governing
practice in the state courts parallel as closely as practicable
the rules in federal court. This general principle guides
some of the recommendations made above. The
committee has always recognized, however, that litigation
in the state courts is different from that in the federal
courts, and that Minnesota concerns may dictate different
41
rules.
In many ways, this statement articulates a very consistently
applied guiding principle. The 1996 report containing it
recommended against the adoption of automatic disclosures, which

40. The bringing of post-trial motions has a substantial impact on appellate
review in Minnesota appellate practice. See generally 3 ERIC J. MAGNUSON, DAVID F.
HERR & SAM HANSON, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: APPELLATE RULES ANNOTATED
§§ 103.16–.19 (2013 ed.) (discussing scope of review and limitations caused by
failure to raise issues in post-trial motions, especially motions for a new trial under
MINN. R. CIV. P. 59).
41. RECOMMENDATIONS OF MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT 2 (July 22, 1996) [hereinafter
RECOMMENDATIONS 1996], available at http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents
/0/Public/administration/AdministrationFiles/Civil%20Procedure%20Rules
%20ADM04-8001%20formerly%20C6-84-2134/1996-07-29%20SC%20Advisory%20
Cmte%20Report.pdf; see also RECOMMENDATIONS OF MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT 2 (Sept. 26,
2005) [hereinafter RECOMMENDATIONS 2005], available at http://www.mncourts
.gov/Documents/0/Public/administration/AdministrationFiles/Civil
%20Procedure%20Rules%20ADM04-8001%20formerly%20C6-84-2134/2005-09
-26%20Civ%20Proc%20Final%20Rpt.pdf (reiterating preference for having state
rules conform to federal counterparts).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014

11

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 3

2014]

E-DISCOVERY UNDER THE MINNESOTA RULES

401
42

had been adopted in federal court only three years earlier.
43
Automatic disclosures were not adopted in Minnesota until 2013.
In 1988, the Minnesota Advisory Committee proposed and
recommended to the court extensive amendments to delete
44
gender-specific language from the rules. These amendments also
included an amendment to Minnesota Rule 30.02 to provide for
taking depositions by telephone, adopting language identical to the
45
1980 amendment to the federal counterpart to that rule.
In 1999, the Advisory Committee recommended that the court
adopt changes to Minnesota Rule 11 to conform the rule to Federal
46
Rule 11 as it had been amended in 1993. The Advisory Committee
also recommended that the court defer any action on adoption of
the automatic disclosure provisions that the Federal Rules adopted
47
in 1996. It was not until 2013 that those rules would become part
48
of Minnesota practice.
In 2006, the Committee recommended several changes to the
Minnesota Rules, including four that involved virtually wholesale
adoption in Minnesota of recently adopted federal rule
49
amendments. These included adoption of Federal Rule 23 on
50
51
class actions, Rule 53 on special masters, Rule 50 on the
42. See RECOMMENDATIONS 1996, supra note 41, at 3. Minnesota’s reluctance
to embrace automatic disclosures was undoubtedly at least partly a product of the
controversial reception disclosure had received in the federal courts. As originally
adopted in 1993, districts were allowed to opt out of its provisions, and more than
one-fourth of the districts had done so, including many of the larger metropolitan
districts with larger caseloads. See Stempel, supra note 29, at 199 n.14. The option
to opt out by local rule adopted in 1993 was removed by the 2000 amendments to
the rules. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee’s note (2000
amendment).
43. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.01 (effective July 1, 2013).
44. See RECOMMENDATIONS OF MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: FINAL REPORT 2 (Mar. 25, 1988).
45. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 30.02 advisory committee’s comment (1988
amendment). This rule provision is currently numbered MINN. R. CIV. P. 30.02(g).
46. Id. R. 11 advisory committee’s comment (1999 amendment).
47. RECOMMENDATIONS OF MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT 2 (July 13, 1999) available at http://
www.mncourts.gov/Documents/0/Public/administration/AdministrationFiles
/Civil%20Procedure%20Rules%20ADM04-8001%20formerly%20C6-84-2134/1999
-07-16%20SC%20Advisory%20Cmte%20Report.pdf.
48. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
49. See RECOMMENDATIONS 2005, supra note 41.
50. MINN. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s comment (2006 amendment).
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52

nomenclature for post-trial motions, and—importantly, for the
subject of this article—amendments to Rules 26 and 30 to modify
53
the scope of discovery and limit the duration of depositions.
V. THE CIVIL RULES AND THE EARLY DAYS OF THE COMPUTER AGE
Because neither the Federal nor Minnesota Rules provided
explicit rules for dealing with computers and data in electronic
formats, the courts were initially left to resolve issues relating to
data created or residing on computer systems under rules that
contemplated documents as paper things. The courts had rules
that were intended to diminish the role of formalism, and
54
electronic documents could be treated as “documents.” In the
early days, applying the existing rules worked just fine to answer
discovery issues that occasionally arose. The simple question of
“what would the answer be for paper records?” worked to answer
questions about computer records. If a party maintained records
on a computer system, most courts had little difficulty concluding
that they were “documents” and thus discoverable to the extent
55
their paper counterparts would have been. As volume increased,
however, and as computer systems didn’t really emulate the paper
world, the answers provided by the rules proved more elusive and
less satisfactory. File cabinets didn’t generally contain every draft of
paper documents or detailed records of every change to every
document. Letters occasionally would be copied to a few additional
recipients or might attach a single earlier piece of correspondence.
In the e-mail world, letters might be directed to a long list of
recipients or even to a group list. Dozens of earlier rounds of
messages might be appended, and any of those forwarded to
others. The result is a collection of issues that the rules just didn’t
address well, and the “analogy to paper” wasn’t obvious—there
wasn’t necessarily a clear analogy to paper.
The courts’ recognition of electronic data and information as
“documents” gained significant traction in the early 1970s. In 1970,

51. Id. R. 53 advisory committee’s comment (2006 amendment).
52. Id. R. 50 advisory committee’s comment (2006 amendment).
53. Id. R. 26.02, 30.04 advisory committee’s comments (2006 amendment).
54. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (applying the same procedure for producing
“documents or electronically stored information”).
55. See infra notes 56, 67.
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Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was amended to
provide for the production of “data compilations from which
information can be obtained, translated, if necessary, by the
respondent through detection devices into reasonably usable
56
form.” Professors Wright and Miller characterized this language as
57
“bringing the rules ‘into the computer age.’” In Adams v. Dan
58
River Mills, Inc., the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia applied these rule changes to require
production of computer cards and tapes, stating:
Examination of the notes of the Advisory Committee on
Rules pertaining to Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure reveals that the Committee was aware of the
effect which technology in the field of electronic data
processing might have in discovery. The notes of the
Committee state in part:
The inclusive description of ‘documents’ is revised to
accord with changing technology. It makes clear that Rule
34 applies to electronic data compilations from which
information can be obtained only with the use of
detection devices, and that when data can as a practical
matter be made usable by the discovering party only
through respondent’s devices, respondent may be
required to use his devices to translate the data to usable
form. In many instances, this means that respondent will
have to supply a print-out of computer data. The burden
thus placed on respondent will vary from case to case, and
the courts have ample power under Rule 26(c) to protect
respondent against undue burden or expense, either by
restricting discovery or requiring that the discovering
party pay costs . . . .
While it appears to this court that the above language
only directly covers the situation where the respondent
can be required to prepare the information in a usable
form, such as a print-out, it does not appear to preclude
the production of computer in-put information such as
computer cards or tapes. Likewise, this court is aware of
56. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1) advisory committee’s notes (1970 amendment).
See also Pearl Brewing Co. v. Joseph Schiltz Brewing Co., 415 F. Supp. 1122, 1136
(S.D. Tex. 1976).
57. Pearl Brewing Co., 415 F. Supp. at 1136 (citing 8 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note
36, § 2218).
58. 54 F.R.D. 220 (W.D. Va. 1972).
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no reason why documents of this nature should not be
59
subject to discovery.
Based on the 1970 amendments to Rule 34, courts frequently
60
ordered parties to produce computer printouts, computer cards
61
or tapes, and even allowed an opposing party to use the
producing party’s computer machinery for duplication or
62
replication of regularly compiled information. Courts also showed
a willingness to impose sanctions for a party’s failure to produce
63
such information in response to legitimate discovery requests.
Similarly, courts regularly entertained requests to shift the costs of
preparing and producing electronic information to the requesting
64
party.
The courts’ focus on broad functionality continues to provide
the answers to numerous e-discovery questions, even as technology
evolves. A digital record of an x-ray examination under the rules

59. Id. at 222 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note (1970
amendment)) (requiring the production of electronic records even after paper
versions had been previously requested and produced). This would not be the
presumptive ruling under the Federal Rules following the 2006 amendments, as
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(iii) explicitly provides that a party need not produce
electronically stored information in more than one form.
60. See, e.g., Macrovision Corp. v. VSA, Ltd., No. 88-315-FR, 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11246, at *8 (D. Or. Sept. 20, 1989); Colorado v. Schmidt-Tiago Constr.
Co., 108 F.R.D. 731, 735 (D. Colo. 1986); Adams, 54 F.R.D. at 222.
61. See, e.g., Kuenz v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Nos. 83-1469C(3),
84-0475C(3), 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21858, at *2–3 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 12, 1985);
Ottaviani v. State Univ. of N.Y., No. 77 Civ. 6259 (SWK), 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23346, *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 1985); Allen v. Isaac, 100 F.R.D. 373, 377 (N.D. Ill.
1983); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 79-1957A, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16068,
*15 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 9, 1980); Adams, 54 F.R.D. at 222. But see Williams v. Owens-Ill.,
Inc., 665 F.2d 918, 933 (9th Cir. 1982) (affirming denial of motion to compel
production of computer tapes where all information contained on the tapes was
included in wage cards, which were produced).
62. See, e.g., Macrovision Corp., 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11246, at *8 (requiring
defendant to use its computer devices to translate data into usable form for
plaintiff).
63. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115 F.R.D. 543,
555–56 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
64. See, e.g., Williams v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 119 F.R.D. 648, 651
(W.D. Ky. 1987); Kuenz, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21858, at *2–3; Adams, 54 F.R.D. at
222. But see Sanders v. Levy, 558 F.2d 636, 648–51 (2d Cir. 1976) (affirming district
court’s decision not to shift the cost of computer discovery to the requesting
party).
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should be expected to be just as discoverable as a silver-emulsion
film would be. These functional equivalencies have also served to
analyze evidentiary issues, although questions under the rules of
evidence may be more complicated, or at least different. A digital
photograph is not identical to a Kodachrome print, and even less
so to a Kodachrome negative. (Digital photos may be more readily
65
altered, at least at the clumsy level. ) Digital x-rays may reveal clear
evidence of an injury or no suggestion of it, depending on contrast
and other settings of the playback device, but this does not prevent
66
the discovery of the images.
VI. THE ADVENT OF “E-DISCOVERY” AS A NEW SET OF ISSUES
At some point courts, litigators, and commentators recognized
that some of the differences between the world of paper and the
67
world of electronics didn’t map to each other perfectly. Some
things that worked just fine for paper didn’t really work so well for
electronics. As electronic discovery advanced, the traditional
approach became only the starting point. The question
transformed to become, first, what would the answer be for paper
records, but would then be modified to consider the additional
68
issues such as volume, number of locations, and data volatility.
These issues can be addressed by courts on a case-by-case basis, but

65. For discussion of the evidentiary issues relating to evidence that is
created or exists in electronic form, see Keiko L. Sugisaka & David F. Herr,
Admissibility of E-Evidence in Minnesota: New Problems or Evidence as Usual?, 35 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1453 (2009). For particular focus on digital photographs, see
Christine A. Guilshan, Note, A Picture Is Worth a Thousand Lies: Electronic Imaging
and the Future of the Admissibility of Photographs into Evidence, 18 RUTGERS COMPUTER
& TECH. L.J. 365 (1992).
66. See, e.g., Suzanne Collins, Medical Malpractice Litigation: What Are the
Foundational Requirements for High-Tech Exhibits?, 212 N.J. L.J., May 6, 2013, at 301.
67. Electronic data, unlike paper data, may be incomprehensible when
separated from its environment. . . . If the raw data (without the
underlying structure) in a database is produced, it will appear as
merely a long list of undefined numbers. To make sense of the data, a
viewer needs the context that includes labels, columns, report formats,
and other information.
THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC
DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 4 (Jonathan M. Redgrave et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007).
68. See In re John Doe Proceeding, 680 N.W.2d 792, 809 (Wis. 2004)
(Abrahamson, J., concurring).
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a strong case can be made to facilitate rules or standards to
facilitate decisions. It is hard to pinpoint a specific advent of
69
“e-discovery” as a separate field of inquiry. There was no landmark
event that marks the beginning of the era; it is marked more by the
increasing use of digital computers in business and throughout
70
society. We have all been struggling to keep up ever since.
Probably the three most important differences of the
71
electronic world are persistence, volume, and volatility. These are
somewhat mirror-image features that create different problems in
very similar ways. Persistence refers to the well-known fact that
electronic documents, once created or saved on a system, may very
72
well persist in some readable form even if they are “deleted.”
Some computer systems are designed to ensure some level of
persistence, by operation of backup and archive systems whose only
purpose is to preserve copies of records created on the system. The
persistence problem is amplified by the continued application of
Moore’s Law and the ever-decreasing cost of mass computer
73
storage. Flash drives with 64- or 128-gigabyte capacity are now
74
readily available. Where storing a thousand pages of documents
69. An early reference to electronic discovery is found in United States v.
Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 863, 869 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (referring to discovery of electronic
surveillance records). References in the 1970s and early 1980s are relatively sparse,
however, and especially sparse in civil cases.
70. See Richard L. Marcus, Confronting the Future: Coping with Discovery of
Electronic Material, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 258–60 (2001); A History of
Windows, WINDOWS, http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/history (last
visited Oct. 19, 2013) (stating that the Microsoft Disk Operating System (MS-DOS)
was introduced in 1980, and IBM introduced the personal computer (PC) in
1981).
71. These differences are discussed by The Sedona Conference Working
Group on Electronic Document Retention and Production, in THE SEDONA
CONFERENCE, supra note 67, at 2−5.
72. Id. at 3.
73. Moore’s Law was articulated in 1980 by Gordon E. Moore, founder of
semiconductor industry pioneer Intel Corp. It is “an axiom of microprocessor
development usually holding that processing power doubles about every 18
months especially relative to cost or size.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY, supra note 7, at 806. For a biography on Moore see IEEE Computer
Society Awards, IEEE COMPUTER SOC’Y, http://www.computer.org/portal/web
/awards/moore-goode (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).
74. The capacity of a 64-gigabyte (GB) flash drive depends on the types of
data stored, but a rule of thumb for Word documents is that a 64-GB drive can
hold 58,100 documents. SanDisk Support, SANDISK, http://kb.sandisk.com/app
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was once expensive, the inexorable lowering of the cost makes the
cost relatively trivial today. Persistence also contributes directly to
the problem of volume. There are now exponentially more records
involved in litigation than would once have been possible.
Volume is a significant difference even aside from the
75
persistent accumulation of electronic records. The vast size of
data collections stored on a computer system really converts a
quantitative difference into a fundamental, qualitative difference.
Volume relates directly to cost, but not always in an obvious way. It
is easy to draft a plausible-sounding document request that might
call for production of a million documents. The same request forty
years ago might have reached one or two hundred documents. The
difference is accounted for by the proliferation of record creation
as well as reproduction and dissemination of records across broad
networks. Phone messages that would have been regularly
destroyed when the call was returned now may go into nearly
permanent computer storage. Computer storage itself might create
scores of copies in various archive files.
Volatility refers to the ease with which an electronic document
can be altered or erased even if no one directly asks that to
76
happen. The simplest example of this occurs when a document is
edited and then saved—on some systems the earlier version may be
overwritten and lost forever. In other systems, it may persist in the
form of an earlier version of the saved document. Even booting up
a computer can change data contained on it.
To address these differences between paper and electronic
documents, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were extensively
amended in 2006.
VII. THE FEDERAL RULES AMENDMENTS IN 2006
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that took
effect on December 1, 2006, were widely referred to as “e-discovery”
amendments. They constituted a fairly comprehensive attempt to
address new and anticipated issues involving e-discovery and

/answers/detail/a_id/3651/~/number-of-photos,-songs,-documents,-and-video
-hours-a-sandisk-ultra-backup-usb (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).
75. See THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 67, at 2.
76. The Sedona Principles refer to volatility as “dynamic, changeable content.”
Id. at 3.
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included few other topics. These amendments are now an
established part of the federal litigation system and are generally
77
viewed to have worked well.
The amendments in 2006 defined “electronically stored
information” (ESI) and incorporated the phrase into numerous
rules to make it clear that disclosure and discovery obligations
78
applied equally to “paper” and electronic documents. Specifically,
these amendments included revisions and additions to Rules 16,
26, 33, 34, 37, and 45, as well as to Form 35.
The amendments to Rule 16(b) were “designed to alert . . .
court[s] to the possible need to address the handling of discovery
79
of [ESI] early in . . . litigation.” Rule 16 now explicitly states that
the court’s scheduling order may “provide for disclosure or
80
discovery of electronically stored information.”
The amendments to Rule 26(a), Rule 26(f), and Form 35
require parties to include ESI in their initial disclosures and to
“meet and confer” early on regarding ESI data preservation, form
77. See generally Bennett B. Borden et al., Four Years Later: How the 2006
Amendments to the Federal Rules Have Reshaped the E-Discovery Landscape and Are
Revitalizing the Civil Justice System, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH., no. 3, 2011, ¶¶ 11, 13
(“This newfound proficiency [following adoption of the amendments] is finally
helping achieve the primary goal of civil litigation: ‘the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.’”).
78. Rule 34 defines “electronically stored information” to include “writings,
drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound recordings, images, and other data
or data compilations—stored in any medium from which information can be
obtained either directly or, if necessary, after translation by the responding party
into a reasonably usable form . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1)(A). The 2006 Advisory
Committee Notes make clear that the drafters purposefully did not limit the
definition of electronically stored information:
The wide variety of computer systems currently in use, and the rapidity
of technological change, counsel against a limiting or precise
definition of electronically stored information. Rule 34(a)(1) is
expansive and includes any type of information that is stored
electronically. . . . The rule covers—either as documents or as
electronically stored information—information “stored in any
medium,” to encompass future developments in computer technology.
Rule 34(a)(1) is intended to be broad enough to cover all current
types of computer-based information, and flexible enough to
encompass future changes and developments.
Id. R. 34 advisory committee’s note (2006 amendment).
79. Id. R. 16 advisory committee’s note (2006 amendment).
80. Id. R. 16(b)(3)(B)(iii).
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81

of production, and privilege waiver.
Specifically, Rule
26(a)(1)(A)(ii) requires each party to disclose, without receiving a
discovery request, “electronically stored information” in its
possession, custody, or control that it may use to support its claims
82
or defenses. Rule 26(f) directs parties to discuss discovery of ESI if
discovery of ESI is likely to be sought in the action and to
83
incorporate any issues related to ESI into their discovery plan.
Form 35 was amended to include a report to the court about the
results of the parties’ discussion about how they intend to handle
84
ESI.
The amendments to Rule 26(b)(2)(B) created a
proportionality provision in Rule 26, placing specific limits on the
discovery of ESI based on an “accessibility” test:
(b) Discovery Scope and Limits.
....
(2) Limitations on Frequency and Extent.
....
(B) Specific Limitations on Electronically Stored
Information. A party need not provide discovery of
electronically stored information from sources
that the party identifies as not reasonably
accessible because of undue burden or cost. On
motion to compel discovery or for a protective
order, the party from whom discovery is sought
must show that the information is not reasonably
accessible because of undue burden or cost. If that
showing is made, the court may nonetheless order
discovery from such sources if the requesting party
shows good cause, considering the limitations of
Rule 26(b)(2)(C). The court may specify
85
conditions for the discovery.
Inclusion of these limitations was “designed to address issues
raised by difficulties in locating, retrieving, and providing discovery
86
of” certain ESI. Rule 26(b) now creates a “two-tiered” system for
81. See id. R. 26(f)(1); see also id. R. 26(a), Form 35.
82. Id. R. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii).
83. Id. R. 26(f)(3)(C).
84. Id. R. 16 advisory committee’s note (2006 amendment); see also id.
Form 52.
85. Id. R. 26(b).
86. Id. R. 26 advisory committee’s note (2006 amendment).
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the discovery of ESI: “accessible” vs. “not reasonably accessible.”
The first “tier” consists of accessible ESI, which a responding party
88
must produce at its own cost. The second “tier” pertains to ESI
89
that is “not reasonably accessible.” Because some sources of ESI
can only be accessed “with substantial burden and cost,” Rule 26
treats those sources of ESI as “not reasonably accessible” and
90
requires good cause to obtain discovery of them.
The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 26 clarify that in
addition to producing “reasonably accessible” ESI, a responding
party “must also identify, by category or type, the sources
containing potentially responsive information that it is neither
91
searching nor producing.” In addition, “[t]he identification
should, to the extent possible, provide enough detail to enable the
requesting party to evaluate the burdens and costs of providing the
discovery and the likelihood of finding responsive information on
92
the identified sources.” Rule 26(b)(2) does not define the
different types of technological features that may affect the
93
burdens and costs of accessing ESI.
As further set forth in the Advisory Committee Notes, courts
may consider various factors in determining whether to require a
responding party to search for and produce information that is
“not reasonably accessible.” Those factors include:
(1) the specificity of the discovery request; (2) the
quantity of information available from other and more
easily accessed sources; (3) the failure to produce relevant
information that seems likely to have existed but is no
longer available on more easily accessed sources; (4) the
likelihood of finding relevant, responsive information that
87. See MICHAEL R. ARKFELD, ARKFELD ON ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND
EVIDENCE § 7.4(G)(1)(a) (3d ed. 2013); see also Thomas Y. Allman, Conducting
E-Discovery After the Amendments: The Second Wave, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 215, 222
(2009).
88. Allman, supra note 87, at 224 (citing Zubulake v. UBS Warburg L.L.C.,
216 F.R.D. 280, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory
committee’s note (2006 amendment) (“[A] responding party should produce
electronically stored information that is relevant, not privileged, and reasonably
accessible, subject to the (b)(2)(C) limitations that apply to all discovery.”).
89. ARKFELD, supra note 87, § 7.4(G)(1)(a).
90. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (2006 amendment).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See id.
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cannot be obtained from other, more easily accessed
sources; (5) predictions as to the importance and
usefulness of the further information; (6) the importance
of the issues at stake in the litigation; and (7) the parties’
94
resources.
Even if discovery of ESI that is not reasonably accessible is
permitted, courts may impose conditions on that discovery,
95
including that the requesting party bear some or all of the costs.
The amendment to Rule 33(d), which permits a party to
produce business records in response to an interrogatory, specifies
96
that the definition of “business records” includes ESI.
Rule 34(a) was amended to confirm that discovery of ESI
97
stands on “equal footing” with discovery of paper documents.
Rule 34(a)(1)(A) now states that a party may serve a discovery
request to produce and permit the requesting party to “inspect,
copy, test, or sample . . . documents or electronically stored information—
including . . . sound recordings, images, and other data . . . stored in any
98
medium.” Rule 34(b)(1)(C) now states that a document request
“may specify the form or forms in which electronically stored
99
information is to be produced.” Finally, Rule 34(b)(2)(D) and
(E)(ii)–(iii) state:
(D) Responding to a Request for Production of
Electronically Stored Information. The response may state an
objection to a requested form for producing electronically
stored information. If the responding party objects to a
requested form—or if no form was specified in the
request—the party must state the form or forms it intends
to use.
(E) Producing the Documents or Electronically Stored
Information. Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the
court, these procedures apply to producing documents or
electronically stored information:
....
(ii) If a request does not specify a form for
producing electronically stored information, a party
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
Id. R. 33(d).
Id. R. 34 advisory committee’s note (2006 amendment).
Id. R. 34(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
Id. R. 34(b)(1)(C).
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must produce it in a form or forms in which it is
ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably usable form
or forms; and
(iii) A party need not produce the same
electronically stored information in more than one
100
form.
Like Rule 34, Rule 45 was also amended to specifically state
that a subpoena may command a nonparty to produce or to permit
the inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of “electronically
stored information” and “may specify the form or forms in which
101
electronically stored information is to be produced.”
The
subpoenaed person may object in writing to inspecting, copying,
testing, sampling, or producing ESI in the form or forms
102
requested. Paralleling the amendments to Rules 26 and 34, the
amendments to Rule 45 go on to state that a subpoenaed party
“need not provide discovery of electronically stored information
from sources that the person identifies as not reasonably accessible
103
because of undue burden or cost.”
Finally, Rule 37, which grants courts authority to impose
sanctions for noncompliance with discovery rules, was amended to
specify that, absent exceptional circumstances, courts may not
impose sanctions on a party for failing to provide ESI that was lost
as a result of “the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic
104
information system.” The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 37
explains this rule in greater detail:
When a party is under a duty to preserve information
because of pending or reasonably anticipated litigation,
intervention in the routine operation of an information
system is one aspect of what is often called a “litigation
hold.” Among the factors that bear on a party’s good faith
in the routine operation of an information system are the
steps the party took to comply with a court order in the
case or party agreement requiring preservation of specific
105
electronically stored information.

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. R. 34(b)(2)(D), (E)(ii)−(iii).
Id. R. 45(a)(1)(A)(iii), (C)–(D).
Id. R. 45(c)(2)(B).
Id. R. 45(d)(1)(D).
Id. R. 37(e).
Id. R. 37 advisory committee’s note (2006 amendment).
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A general consensus has developed that the 2006 federal
amendments have worked reasonably well and have had a clear
106
impact on the civil justice system in federal court.
VIII. ADOPTION OF AMENDMENTS IN MINNESOTA IN 2007
Minnesota adopted the essential provisions of the 2006 federal
rule amendments in 2007. These amendments were known as
“e-discovery amendments” because of their particular focus on
e-discovery and related discovery reform issues. The most
important changes brought by the 2007 amendments include: a
107
provision for addressing e-discovery in scheduling orders;
adoption of “two-tier” discovery, making ESI that is not “reasonably
108
accessible” not automatically discoverable; an express propor109
tionality provision;
a provision permitting a post-production
assertion of a claim of privilege and requiring the return of
110
information subject to such a claim; a requirement that a motion
for a discovery conference include identification of electronic
111
discovery information;
various provisions for the mechanical
aspects of e-discovery, including the right to request a specific
format for production and specifying the formats that are
112
acceptable for production; and a “safe-harbor” provision to limit
the imposition of sanctions for loss of information by “routine,
113
good-faith operation of an electronic information system.” The
e-discovery amendments also revised several rules to make explicit
that “electronically stored information” is subject to discovery,
114
including discovery from nonparties by use of subpoena.
In addition, Minnesota Rule 26.06, like Federal Rule 26(f),
now directs parties to discuss discovery of ESI if ESI is likely to be

106. See generally Borden et al., supra note 77, ¶¶ 59−60 (concluding that rules
have brought changes consistent with Rule 1’s aspiration that the rules operated to
secure the “just, speedy, and inexpensive” resolution of cases).
107. MINN. R. CIV. P. 16.02(d).
108. Id. R. 26.02(b)(2). Rule 45.04(a)(4) of the Minnesota Rules of Civil
Procedure extended this limitation to nonparty discovery by subpoena.
109. Id. R. 26.02(b)(3).
110. Id. R. 26.02(f)(2).
111. Id. R. 26.06(c).
112. Id. R. 34.02.
113. Id. R. 37.05.
114. See, e.g., id. R. 45 advisory committee’s comment (2007 amendment).
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sought in the action, and to incorporate any issues related to ESI
115
into their discovery plan. With these changes, the Minnesota
Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to e-discovery became virtually
identical to the Federal Rules, although Minnesota’s new Rule 1,
adopted in 2013, creating an across-the-board proportionality
116
requirement, is an important Minnesota innovation.
An interesting footnote to the 2007 amendments in Minnesota
is that the Minnesota Advisory Committee once again did not
recommend adoption of the automatic disclosures that were
117
adopted in the federal courts in 1993,
and the Minnesota
Supreme Court did not include any requirement for initial
118
disclosures in the 2007 changes to Minnesota Rule 26. Automatic
disclosures would not become part of Minnesota state court
litigation until 2013, when Minnesota Rule 26 was amended to
119
mirror Federal Rule 26. Like the Federal Rule, Minnesota Rule
26.01 now requires each party to disclose, without receiving a
discovery request and within sixty days of the Answer’s original due
120
date, “electronically stored information . . . in its possession,
custody, or control [that it] may use to support its claims or
121
defenses.”
IX. MINNESOTA ACTS ON CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM
The year 2013 was possibly a landmark year for the Minnesota
civil justice system, as the Minnesota Supreme Court took
unmistakable steps to improve the operation of the civil justice
system. Following several years of study, in 2011 the Minnesota
Supreme Court received a report from its Civil Justice Reform Task

115. Id. R. 26.06(c)(3).
116. Id. R. 1; see infra note 133 and accompanying text.
117. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (1993 amendment)
(“Through the addition of paragraphs (1)-(4), this subdivision imposes on parties
a duty to disclose, without awaiting formal discovery requests, certain basic
information that is needed in most cases to prepare for trial or make an informed
decision about settlement.”), with MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.01 (2007).
118. MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.01 (2007).
119. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a), with MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.01 (effective July 1,
2013).
120. MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.01(a)(3).
121. Id. R. 26.01(a)(1)(B).
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Force, chaired by the Honorable Louise Dovre Bjorkman, and the
court responded by implementing several of the recommendations.
The Task Force was a broadly diverse group of lawyers, judges,
122
and court personnel. The Task Force met essentially monthly and
gathered information from various sources, including from a judge
in Oregon who explained civil justice reform measures adopted
123
there. The Task Force’s work culminated in a formal report to
124
the Minnesota Supreme Court. This task force report contained
recommendations on a wide variety of issues, including some that
125
intended to address e-discovery issues. The recommendations fell
in several categories:
1. Proportionality;
2. Requirement for filing actions within one year;
3. Adoption of automatic disclosures;
4. Requirement of a discovery conference of counsel and
discovery plan in every case (except those excluded
from the operation of the rule);
5. Modified case scheduling process;
6. New expedited motion process;
7. A new rule on managing complex cases; and
8. A pilot project for expedited case management in the
126
First and Sixth Districts.
The task force recommendation that Minnesota adopt the
automatic disclosure changes adopted in the Federal Rules in 1993
is important but hardly earthshaking. By 2013, these changes were
firmly a part of federal court practice and were generally viewed as
effective at least to some degree in moving important parts of the

122. See MINN. SUPREME COURT CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM TASK FORCE, FINAL
REPORT 1 (Dec. 23, 2011) [hereinafter RECOMMENDATIONS 2011], available at
http://www2.mnbar.org/sections/outstate-practice/Final%20civil%20reform
%20task%20force%20report.pdf.
123. Id. at 4.
124. Id. at 1–85.
125. Id. at 17.
126. Id. at 17–35. The committee’s recommendations and the court’s action
on them are discussed in Louise Dovre Bjorkman & David F. Herr, Reducing Cost &
Delay: Minnesota Courts Revise Civil Case Handling, BENCH & B. MINN., June 2013,
at 26, 27–29. For general analysis of the need for proportionality, see Gordon W.
Netzorg & Tobin D. Kern, Proportional Discovery: Making It the Norm, Rather Than the
Exception, 87 DENVER U. L. REV. 513, 513–32 (2010).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol40/iss2/3

26

Herr and Markison: E-Discovery under the Minnesota Rules: Where We've Been, Where We

416

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:2

127

litigation process earlier in the life of a case. This “front-loading”
both accelerates the ultimate resolution of a case and reduces the
128
cost spent on the litigation. Importantly, Minnesota’s rules now
require that the parties get together to confer on the discovery and
129
other case management needs of the case. This requirement
130
applies to cases even where they are not yet filed.
Similarly, the new expedited motion practice for non131
dispositive motions, adopted upon the recommendation of the
132
Task Force, will have particular impact on discovery motions.
Discovery motions are time consuming and result in delay of the
litigation, and often present issues that can be decided fairly
quickly once presented to the court. The expedited process is
designed to deliver that efficiency in appropriate cases. The most
important change is probably the proportionality rule. It is
contained in Rule 1 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure,
which now provides:
Rule 1. Scope of Rules
These rules govern the procedure in the district
courts of the State of Minnesota in all suits of a civil
nature, with the exceptions stated in Rule 81. They shall
be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action.
It is the responsibility of the court and the parties to
examine each civil action to assure that the process and
the costs are proportionate to the amount in controversy
127. See WRIGHT ET AL, supra note 36, § 2053 n.39 (citing Thomas E. Willging
et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule
Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 563 (1998)).
128. See Paul V. Niemeyer, Here We Go Again: Are the Federal Discovery Rules Really
In Need of Amendment?, 39 B.C. L. REV. 517, 523 (1998) (reporting that users of
litigation systems view disclosures as reducing cost of litigation and that judges
should be involved earlier). But see John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The
Need for Effective Civil Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 581 (2010) (noting that
critics have viewed front-loading of costs as creating a barrier to settlement).
129. MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.06.
130. The parties are required to hold a discovery conference within thirty days
from the initial due date of an answer. Id. R. 26.06. Because the Minnesota Rules
do not require that the parties file the action until one year after it is commenced
and commencement requires service but not filing, an action might not be filed
for over ten months after the discovery conference is held.
131. MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 115.04.
132. RECOMMENDATIONS 2011, supra note 122, at 19.
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and the complexity and importance of the issues. The
factors to be considered by the court in making a
proportionality assessment include, without limitation:
needs of the case, amount in controversy, parties’
resources, and complexity and importance of the issues at
133
stake in the litigation.
This provision has no counterpart in the Federal Rules. It is
modeled on language proposed by the Institute for the
134
Advancement of the American Legal System.
It is impossible to predict just what impact this provision will
have on the litigation process, but it is intended to prompt a
fundamental shift in how courts and litigants address a wide variety
of issues. Its placement in Rule 1 is intended to make it clear that it
135
applies potentially to any aspect of the process. The goal behind
the Task Force’s recommendation to and the court’s modification
of Rule 26 was to modify the proportionality provision to make it
136
clearer and more prominent.
The amendment requiring actions to be filed within one year
of commencement is intended similarly to foster active judicial
137
management.
Although the responsibility to consider
proportionality applies to the parties and attorneys, it is also an
important responsibility of judges, and having cases under the
supervision of a judge can be expected to reinforce the
consideration of proportionality.
X. ONGOING ISSUES REGARDING E-DISCOVERY AND THE RULES
There are two notable ongoing issues regarding the current
iteration of Minnesota’s procedural rules pertaining to e-discovery.
First, although Minnesota has specifically adopted a “proportionality” rule, it is yet to be seen how this rule will impact e133. MINN. R. CIV. P. 1. The second paragraph was added to the rule by the
2013 amendment. Compare MINN. R. CIV. P. 1 (2012), with MINN. R. CIV. P. 1
(effective July 1, 2013).
134. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., 21ST CENTURY
CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A ROADMAP FOR REFORM PILOT PROJECT RULES 2 (2009),
available at http://iaals.du.edu/images/wygwam/documents/publications/Pilot
_Project_Rules2009.pdf.
135. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 1.
136. Compare MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.02(b) (effective July 1, 2013), with MINN. R.
CIV. P. 26.02(b)(3) (2012).
137. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 5.04.
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discovery. Second, the rules leave open the extent of litigants’
duties to preserve ESI, their culpability for failing to preserve ESI,
and when the duty to preserve ESI arises.
A.

Proportionality

E-discovery is not cheap. There are costs associated with
identifying potentially relevant ESI; extracting and/or copying ESI;
and then reviewing it, document by document, for responsiveness
and privilege. Often, a vendor will have to be hired at the outset to
copy the producing party’s hard drive, which will then have to be
processed and converted into files that can be uploaded into the
reviewing attorney’s document review database. These basic “first
steps” can run into thousands of dollars, even before the producing
party’s attorney has set eyes on a single document. The cost of
e-discovery, when not properly balanced against the value of the
case and the requesting party’s need for the requested ESI,
results in the increased impetus for parties to settle their disputes
prior to trial—regardless of the merits—rather than incur
disproportionately large discovery fees.
Although Rule 1 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure
now mandates that the court and the parties “examine each civil
action to assure that the process and the costs are proportionate to
the amount in controversy,” considering the “needs of the case,
amount in controversy, parties’ resources, and complexity and
138
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation,” it provides no
real guidance as to how this rule should apply to e-discovery.
Likewise, although Rule 26.02 now states that discovery must
“comport with the factors of proportionality,” it provides no greater
139
clarification than Rule 1. Minnesota courts are left with wide
discretion in interpreting and applying these rules.
Although the Federal Rules do not specifically use the term
140
proportionality, they likewise embrace that concept. The Sedona
Conference recently addressed the concept of proportionality as it
relates to the Federal Rules in The Sedona Conference Commentary on
Proportionality in Electronic Discovery (“Sedona Conference Commentary”),
138. Id. R. 1.
139. Compare id., with id. R. 26.02(b).
140. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B), (C) (placing limits on the scope of
discovery).
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recognizing that although the Federal Rules contemplate
141
proportionality, courts have not always insisted upon it. The
Sedona Conference Commentary suggests six principles in
applying proportionality, which are equally applicable in state
courts:
1. The burdens and costs of preservation of potentially
relevant information should be weighed against the
potential value and uniqueness of the information
when determining the appropriate scope of
preservation.
2. Discovery should generally be obtained from the most
convenient, least burdensome, and least expensive
source.
3. Undue burden, expense, or delay resulting from a
party’s action or inaction should be weighed against
that party.
4. Extrinsic information and sampling may assist in the
analysis of whether requested discovery is sufficiently
important to warrant the potential burden or expense
of its production.
5. Nonmonetary factors should be considered when
evaluating the burdens and benefits of discovery.
6. Technologies to reduce cost and burden should be
142
considered in the proportionality analysis.
These principles “provide a framework for applying the doctrine of
143
proportionality to all aspects of electronic discovery.” Given the
untested nature of the proportionality amendments to Minnesota
Rules 1 and 26, these principles may provide greater guidance to
Minnesota courts in achieving the objectives of those rules.
The Federal Advisory Committee is also considering
amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules to explicitly
provide for proportionality. The proposed amendment would
provide that:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged
matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and
proportional to the needs of the case considering the
141. The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Commentary
Proportionality in Electronic Discovery, 14 SEDONA CONF. J. 155, 155 (2013).
142. Id. at 157.
143. Id. at 158.
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amount in controversy, the importance of the issues at
stake in the action, the parties’ resources, the importance
of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the
burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs
144
its likely benefit.
Because the items to be considered in evaluating proportionality
under the proposed federal rule are substantially identical to those
already listed in Minnesota’s current Rule 26.02(b), it is unlikely
that adoption of this federal rule would have any significant impact
145
on the current Minnesota rule. In fact, the Minnesota rule is
arguably more restrictive than the proposed federal rule, as it
allows discovery only of “matters that would enable a party to prove
or disprove a claim or defense or to impeach a witness,” as opposed
to “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or
146
defense.”
Although it has yet to be seen how Minnesota courts will apply
the concept of proportionality to e-discovery, it is clear that if
courts do not give weight to Minnesota’s proportionality rules,
litigants may not be able to afford the cost of getting their cases
ready for trial and may be forced to settle or voluntarily dismiss
their claims, regardless of the merits. On the other hand, applied
as intended, these rules have the potential to significantly decrease
litigation discovery costs, which may afford litigants greater ability
to see their cases through to judicial resolution.
B.

ESI Preservation Duties and Culpability for Failure to Preserve

In addition to the issue of proportionality, the amendments to
the Minnesota Rules also leave open the extent of litigants’ duties
to preserve ESI, their culpability for failing to preserve ESI, and
when the duty to preserve ESI arises. At present, the rules do not
contain any specific provisions relating to the scope of litigants’
duties to preserve ESI, other than stating that sanctions for failing
to provide ESI “lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation
of an electronic information system” may not be imposed “[a]bsent
144. Memorandum from David G. Campbell, supra note 18, at 20.
145. If adopted, however, the proposed federal rule will lead to case law
interpreting and applying its proportionality provision, which may provide
persuasive guidance to Minnesota courts in applying Minnesota’s substantially
identical proportionality provision.
146. Compare MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.02(b), with FED. R. CIV. P. 26.02(b)(1).
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147

exceptional circumstances.”
The 2007 Advisory Committee
Comment recognized that “[t]he good-faith part of this test is
important and is not met if a party fails to take appropriate steps to
148
preserve data once a duty to preserve arises.” However, neither the
rule nor the comment discusses when the duty to preserve arises.
The 2007 Advisory Committee Comment to Minnesota Rule 37.05
(which rule is identical to Federal Rule 37(e)) states that a duty to
preserve arises “because of pending or reasonably anticipated
149
litigation.”
This is consistent with longstanding, and fairly
150
151
and federal
common law.
uniform, Minnesota State
Accordingly, although the rules themselves do not answer the
question of “when” the duty to preserve ESI arises, for the time
being litigants may continue to rely on case law to answer this
question.

147. MINN. R. CIV. P. 37.05.
148. Id. R. 37.05 advisory committee’s comment (2007 amendment)
(emphasis added).
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., Miller v. Lankow, 801 N.W.2d 120, 127–28 (Minn. 2011);
Frontier Pipeline, L.L.C. v. Metro. Council, No. 62-CV-08-2263, 2011 Minn. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 714, at *21–22 (Ct. App. July 25, 2011); Willis v. Ind. Harbor S.S.
Co., 790 N.W.2d 177, 184 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010); Akre v. MetLife Auto & Home
Ins. Co., No. A07-1683, 2008 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1002, at *13 (Ct. App.
Aug. 19, 2008); Huhta v. Thermo King Corp., No. A03-1961, 2004 Minn. App.
LEXIS 722, at *9–10 (Ct. App. June 29, 2004); Spaise v. Dodd, No. A03-1430, 2004
Minn. App. LEXIS 607, at *28 (Ct. App. June 1, 2004); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v.
Heggie’s Full House Pizza, Inc., No. A03-316, 2003 Minn. App. LEXIS 1241, at *12
(Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2003); State Farm Ins. Co. v. Chase, No. C6-01-969, 2002 Minn.
App. LEXIS 68, at *5 (Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2002); Garrison v. Farmers Coop. Exch.,
No. C1-00-657, 2000 Minn. App. LEXIS 1145, at *13 (Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2000);
Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Richway Indus., Ltd., No. C1-99-1963, 2000 Minn. App. LEXIS
810, at *4 (Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2000); Henry v. Joseph, No. C2-98-181, 1998 Minn.
App. LEXIS 948, at *11 (Ct. App. Aug. 18, 1998); Wright v. Romfo, No. C4-951818, 1996 Minn. App. LEXIS 340, at *10 (Ct. App. Mar. 26, 1996).
151. E.g., Waters v. Cafesjian Family Found, Inc., No. 12-648 (RHK/LIB), 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98378, at *6 (D. Minn. June 27, 2012); Cenveo Corp. v. S.
Graphic Sys., Inc., No. 08-5521 (JRT/AJB), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104211, at *9–10
(D. Minn. Sept. 30, 2010); Nicollet Cattle Co. v. United Food Grp., L.L.C., No. 085899 (JRT/FLN), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92951, at *10–11 (D. Minn. Sept. 7,
2010); In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 08-1958 ADM/RLE, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96356, at *4–5 (D. Minn. Nov. 26, 2008); Capellupo v. FMC
Corp., 126 F.R.D. 545, 551 (D. Minn. 1989).
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Neither the Federal or Minnesota Rules, nor the Federal or
Minnesota Advisory Committees, have explained what types of ESI
must be preserved. Although the Federal Advisory Committee
noted that a party’s identification of ESI as “not reasonably
accessible” does not relieve the party of its duty to preserve such
152
evidence, the Advisory Committee did not offer any concrete
guidance about what types of “not reasonably accessible” ESI must
be preserved. Instead, it stated that “[w]hether a responding party
is required to preserve unsearched sources of potentially responsive
information that it believes are not reasonably accessible depends
153
on the circumstances of each case.”
Likewise, the language of Federal Rule 37(e) and Minnesota
Rule 37.05 is unclear as to whether a party may be sanctioned for
“fail[ing] to suspend a deleting or overwriting program that
routinely rids the company’s information system of data that are
154
not reasonably accessible.” Despite the fact that these rules
specifically state that sanctions for failing to provide ESI “lost as a
result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic
155
information system” may not be imposed “[a]bsent exceptional
156
courts have infrequently and inconsistently
circumstances,”
157
applied this provision
and have often imposed discovery
158
sanctions for spoliation of ESI after finding it inapplicable or

152. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (2006 amendment).
153. Id.
154. John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil
Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 591 (2010).
155. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e); MINN. R. CIV. P. 37.05.
156. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e); MINN. R. CIV. P. 37.05.
157. See Memorandum from David G. Campbell, Chair, Advisory Comm. on
Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, to Jeffrey S. Sutton, Chair, Standing Comm. on
Rules of Practice & Procedure 11 (Dec. 5, 2012), available at http://www.uscourts
.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV12-2012.pdf (citing Thomas Y.
Allman, Inadvertent Spoliation of ESI After the 2006 Amendments: The Impact of Rule
37(e), 3 FED. CTS. L. REV. 25, 26 (2009) [hereinafter Allman, Inadvertent Spoliation];
Thomas Y. Allman, Preservation Rulemaking After the 2010 Litigation Conference,
11 SEDONA CONF. J. 217, 227–28 (2010); Philip J. Favro, Sea Change or Status Quo:
Has the 37(e) Safe Harbor Advanced Best Practices for Records Management?, 11 MINN. J.
L. SCI. & TECH. 317, 333–39 (2010)). Only a handful of cases have been directly
influenced by Rule 37(e) in precluding an award of sanctions. Id. (citing cases).
158. See Allman, Inadvertent Spoliation, supra note 157, at 26 nn.2–4 (listing
cases).
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159

without referencing it at all. The unpredictability of litigants’
duties to preserve ESI, and their culpability for failing to preserve
ESI, remain very much open issues under the current rules.
The Federal Advisory Committee has proposed amendments
to Rule 37(e) to address the current rule’s shortcomings. The
proposed new rule reads:
Rule 37(e). Failure to Make Disclosures or to
Cooperate in Discovery; Sanctions
(e) Failure to Preserve Discoverable Information.
(1) Curative measures; sanctions. If a party failed to
preserve discoverable information that should have
been preserved in the anticipation or conduct of
litigation, the court may
(A) permit additional discovery, order curative
measures, or order the party to pay the reasonable
expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the
failure; and
(B) impose any sanction listed in Rule
37(b)(2)(A) or give an adverse-inference jury
instruction, but only if the court finds that the
party’s actions:
(i) caused substantial prejudice in the
litigation and were willful or in bad faith; or
(ii) irreparably deprived a party of any
meaningful opportunity to present or defend
against the claims in the litigation.
(2) Factors to be considered in assessing a party’s
conduct. The court should consider all relevant factors
in determining whether a party failed to preserve
discoverable information that should have been
preserved in the anticipation or conduct of litigation,
and whether the failure was willful or in bad faith. The
factors include:
(A) the extent to which the party was on
notice that litigation was likely and that the
information would be discoverable;

159. E.g., Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am.
Sec., L.L.C., 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 496–97 (S.D.N.Y 2010), abrogated by Chin v. Port
Auth., 685 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2012).
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(B) the reasonableness of the party’s efforts to
preserve the information;
(C) whether the party received a request to
preserve information, whether the request was
clear and reasonable, and whether the person who
made it and the party consulted in good faith
about the scope of preservation;
(D) the proportionality of the preservation
efforts to any anticipated or ongoing litigation;
and
(E) whether the party timely sought the
court’s guidance on any unresolved disputes about
160
preserving discoverable information.
The proposed amended rule would apply to all discoverable
161
information, not just ESI. As clarified in the proposed Advisory
Committee Note, “[t]he amended rule . . . forecloses reliance on
inherent authority or state law to impose litigation sanctions in the
162
absence of the findings required under Rule 37(e)(1)(B).” It is
“designed to ensure that potential litigants who make reasonable
efforts to satisfy their preservation responsibilities may do so with
confidence that they will not be subjected to serious sanctions
163
should information be lost despite those efforts.”
If the proposed amendments to Federal Rule 37(e) are
adopted, it is likely that the Minnesota Advisory Committee will at
some point evaluate whether to amend Rule 37.05 to parallel the
new federal rule. Until then, the extent of litigants’ duties to
preserve ESI, their culpability for failing to preserve ESI, and when
the duty to preserve ESI arises remain open issues in both
Minnesota state and federal courts.
XI. THE FUTURE: THROUGH THE GLASS, DARKLY
Prediction is a risky business. In ancient words, “Those who
have knowledge, don’t predict. Those who predict, don’t have
164
knowledge.” It is hard to divine with certainty where we may be
headed with e-discovery. It seems clear that we can generate
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Memorandum from David G. Campbell, supra note 18, at 43–44.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 44.
Lao Tzu, Chinese Poet (6th Century BC).
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mountains of electronic records that are not needed for the fair
and inexpensive resolution of disputes and that cannot be handled
in the litigation process. The litigation process cannot fairly be
expected to function if it regularly consumes more dollars on
litigation expenses than is in dispute in a particular case.
E-discovery unquestionably contributes to the cost of litigating
many—and an increasing number of—disputes. It is hard to
foresee just what solutions will be put in place to minimize those
costs, while still permitting the parties to obtain the information
needed for the full and fair assessment of the merits of the parties’
disputes.
A few changes in the system seem likely to take place. First, the
proportionality provisions adopted in 2013 will change how
litigants and courts approach discovery matters. Courts will have to
consider the cost of discovery and balance it against the legitimate
needs of the case. Whether the current provisions will accomplish
this remains to be seen, but if they prove inadequate, the Advisory
Committee and the Minnesota Supreme Court can be expected to
come up with additional approaches to the proportionality
challenge.
A fundamental principle of discovery from the inception of
the rules of civil procedure in both federal and state court has been
that the cost of responding to discovery is borne by the party
165
producing information. There have always been exceptions to
this rule, and for discovery from nonparties the rule is typically
reversed—the party requesting information from nonparties can be
166
expected to bear the cost of responding. Because electronic
discovery can impose tremendous burdens on the party having to
locate, review, and produce information stored electronically, it is
reasonable to foresee greater willingness to impose cost-sharing
and cost-shifting presumptions for e-discovery. This is particularly
likely to be combined with proportionality analysis, resulting in an
increased willingness to impose costs on the requesting party when
the requests are burdensome and they appear less related to the
165. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978)
(“[T]he presumption is that the responding party must bear the expense of
complying with discovery requests . . . .”). See generally ROGER S. HAYDOCK & DAVID
F. HERR, DISCOVERY PRACTICE § 27.03[G] (5th ed. 2013).
166. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 45.02(d) (providing for compensation to certain
subpoenaed nonparties).
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issues being litigated or the importance of the requested
information to resolving the issues.
It is unlikely that these changes will be solely the result of
simple adoption or modification of federal rules. The Civil Justice
Reform Task Force approach adopted by the Court in 2013
carefully avoided a single-faceted, rule-focused approach. The Task
Force recommended rule changes but also implemented case
management recommendations that are not simple rule changes.
These non-rule changes may be important in future e-discovery
reforms in Minnesota. The Task Force recommended that courts
make greater use of judicial adjuncts to help resolve pretrial
167
disputes. Encouraging the courts and parties to make use of
special masters to help resolve e-discovery disputes would not
require rule changes—Rule 53 was completely revamped in 2005,
effective on January 1, 2006, and provides ample basis for
168
appointing masters for this purpose.
Similarly, the broad goal of encouraging cooperation can be
addressed in a wide variety of ways. The Task Force recommended
that the Minnesota courts adopt the Sedona Conference’s
169
Cooperation Proclamation.
This is just one change to help
prompt the necessary changes in the approach to litigation issues.
It may well be that other approaches will be implemented.

167. RECOMMENDATIONS 2011, supra note 122, at 31.
168. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 53. See generally 2 DAVID F. HERR & ROGER S. HAYDOCK,
MINNESOTA PRACTICE: CIVIL RULES ANNOTATED §§ 53.01–.09 (5th ed. 2011)
(discussing Rule 53 and the 2005 amendment); Shira A. Scheindlin & Jonathan M.
Redgrave, Special Masters and E-Discovery: The Intersection of Two Recent Revisions to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 347 (2008) (discussing the
special role of special masters in e-discovery).
169. RECOMMENDATIONS 2011, supra note 122, at 35.
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